

## Message Text

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47 41  
ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 5095

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 25, 1973  
(SALT TWO -- 278)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 25, 1973.

MR. MINISTER:

TODAY, AS YOU NOTED, WE RESUME THE SALT TWO NEGOTIATIONS AND  
CONTINUE WORKING TOWARD OUR GOAL, WHICH IS TO REACH A MUTUALLY  
SATISFACTORY PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS  
TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

AS YOU VERY WELL NOTED, SINCE WE LAST MET, THE HIGHEST AUTHOR-  
ITIES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE HELD A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS IN  
WASHINGTON WHICH ARE MOST RELEVANT TO OUR WORK HERE AND SHOULD  
EXPEDITE THESE NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRE-  
TARY BREZHNEV HAVE AGREED THAT OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT YEAR  
SERIOUS EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO WORK OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE  
PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION  
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING IT  
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IN 1974. MEETING THIS GOAL WILL REQUIRE A MAXIMUM EFFORT  
ON THE PART OF OUR DELEGATIONS. IF EACH SIDE TAKES FULLY INTO  
ACCOUNT THE EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE OTHER IN OUR EFFORT  
TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP, WE ARE CONFIDENT THIS GOAL CAN BE ACHIEVED.

II

TODAY'S MEETING IS AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO REVIEW WHERE WE STAND IN THIS SEARCH FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AT THE LAST SESSION, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ITS MARCH 13 PROPOSAL, THE U.S. SUBMITTED ANOTHER SPECIFIC AND BALANCED PROPOSAL FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. WE STATED THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN AGGREGATE CEILING FOR EACH SIDE OF 2350 ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. A CEILING OF 2350 REPRESENTS A REALISTIC LEVEL TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADAPT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ITS CURRENT DEPLOYMENT. WITHIN THIS AGGREGATE CEILING, SUBSTITUTION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND FOR EACH OTHER, WOULD BE PERMITTED. A CEILING ON THE AGGREGATE ICBM THROW-WEIGHT WOULD BE A DEFINITE AND CLEAR WAY OF LIMITING THE LONG TERM POTENTIAL OF THE ICBM FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER A PROGRAM FOR ACHIEVING SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS IN THE CEILINGS ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES.

IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON THE FOREGOING, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT RECIPROCAL ASSURANCES TO THE EFFECT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE AGREEMENT THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD MEET THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS NOT LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AGREED TO IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE.

THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT, FLIGHT TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW OR MODIFIED MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS FOR ICBMS. NEW OR MODIFIED MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS WOULD BE DEFINED AS THOSE SYSTEMS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN  
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FLIGHT TESTED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1973. DEPLOYMENT OF OTHER MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS FOR ICBMS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS WHICH ARE OPERATIONAL OR WHICH ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION FOR SUCH SYSTEMS AS OF AN AGREED DATE. WE HAVE STATED THAT IN THE EVENT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT INCORPORATES LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS AT LEAST AS ADEQUATE AS THOSE WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR PRECISE EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE MISSILES WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED FROM THOSE LAUNCHERS.

III

THE U.S. HAS DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED ITS STRATEGIC ARMS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR THROUGH DETERRENCE. NEAR THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THESE TALKS, AMBASSADOR SMITH ELABORATED THE PURPOSE OF DEPLOYING THESE WEAPONS. HE STATED: "...HAS BEEN TO MAKE IT TOTALLY UNPRODUCTIVE FOR ANY COUNTRY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. WHILE THE U.S. PROPOSES TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE FOR AS LONG AS IT MAY BE REQUIRED, AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE SIMILAR ATTITUDES ON SUCH MATTERS, WE THINK THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO IMPROVEMENT, TO THE BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES, AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF NEITHER." THESE GOALS WERE REAFFIRMED DURING OUR LAST SESSION IN GENEVA AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR OUR APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE ARE CONVINCED, AS WE ARE SURE YOU ARE, THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAN MAKE TOWARD IMPROVING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IS TO COMPLETE THE TASK UNDERTAKEN HERE IN GENEVA IN THE SPIRIT OF THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R." OF MAY 29, 1972, AND THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS" OF JUNE 21, 1973. THESE PRINCIPLES EXPLICITLY SET FORTH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, DIR

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